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  Based on the Law and Finance theory, and the regulatory capture theory, external governance 
environment and industrial regulations can exert a certain influence on corporate over-
investment. On the basis of qualitative analysis of the relationship between external governance 
environment and corporate over-investment under different industrial regulation conditions, this 
paper, using data of non-financial companies listed in Shanghai and Shenzhen Stock Exchanges 
in the period 2001-2010, describes the regional distribution characteristics of over-investment 
of Chinese listed companies, and establishes an OLS regression model of the relationship 
between external governance environment and over-investment. The study respectively groups 
data from regulated and non-regulated industries as a sample and empirically tests the OLS 
regression model. Results show that: from the perspective of economic geography, there exists 
a local spatial cluster phenomenon in the distribution of over-investment of listed companies in 
regulated industries, while non-regulated industries conform to no regularity. In regulated 
industries, external governance environment factors (level of government intervention, rule of 
law and financial development) may exert a significant negative influence on the degree of 
over-investment of listed companies, but on non-regulated industries, their effect is reversed. 
Also, government intervention, legal enforcement and financial development are positively 
correlated to over-investment. Further research indicates that, compared with government 
intervention and financial development, legal enforcement influences over-investment the most. 
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1. Introduction 
The market mechanism is not perfect. In some economic fields, mainly fields in which exist natural 
monopoly, economic externalities and the production of public goods, malfunction may occur. 
Therefore, the government needs to regulate many industries in the economic fields, which are related 
to peoples’ livelihoods. In China, regulated industries mainly refer to industries that involve national 
security, natural monopoly, provide important public goods and services along with mainstay 
industries and high-tech industries. Due to the existence of government regulations, regulated and 
non-regulated industries show great differences in the investment decision-making. And the 
manifestation and economic consequences of this difference have drawn a great attention of   2330
academics and practitioners. Studies show that enterprises in regulated industries have a tendency of 
over-investing so as to realize more absolute profits (A-J effect) (Averch & Johnson, 1962; 
Takayama, 1969). Many literatures study over-investment behavior from the information asymmetry 
theory, agency theory, free cash flow theory, risk preference theory and overconfidence theory, and 
have so far achieved fruitful results. La Porta et al. (1998, 1999, 2003)
 find in their study that external 
governance environment has an important impact on enterprise’s business decisions, and this has 
provided a new perspective for follow-up studies. Perotti and Thadden (2006), Djankov et al. (2007) 
and Bergman and Nicolaievsky (2007) confirm that the external governance environment such as 
legal system, religion, and social culture also have an important influence on enterprise’s business 
decisions. The external governance environment with Chinese characteristics paves way for good 
corporate finance practices, a phenomenon, which is rooted in corporate investment behavior and 
differs considerably from Western countries. The corporate investment behavior, which is rooted in 
this particular phenomenon is also different from western countries. In China, the problem of 
enterprises' investment hunger is not caused irrationally, but rather a kind of rational choice to adapt 
to the external governance environment (Williamson, 2000). Therefore, it is of important theoretical 
and practical significance to study the effects of different external governance environment on 
enterprise over-investment and then apply the transnational comparative framework proposed by La 
Porta et al. (1998) to compare China's regional differences. Given this, we build the over-investment 
econometric model and draw over-investment regional distribution characteristic pattern of China's 
listed companies. We also examine the influence of external governance environment on over-
investment behavior of regulated and non-regulated industries, and analyze what causes the 
difference in the influence. 
2. Review of the relevant studies and research hypotheses 
 
2.1 Review of relevant studies  
Broadly speaking, North (1990), the Nobel laureate in economics, argues that external governance 
environment is a set of tools, including; political, social, and legal rules, that are used to establish the 
foundation for production, exchange, and distribution, which constitutes the incentive mechanism of 
the human political or economic transactions trading behavior. In a narrow sense, Chinese scholars 
Xia and Fang (2005) suggest that external governance environment should at least include property 
rights protection, governance, rule of law, market competition, credit system, contract culture, etc. 
Studies have shown that enterprises from countries in economic transition face greater external 
uncertainties. They must be quick to react to the information about institutional changes and timely 
adjust production and management decisions. Since La Porta et al. (2003)
 established the law and 
finance theory, a number of scholars have conducted various research works on firm value (Black, 
2001), capital structure (Pagano & Volpin, 2005), earnings management
 (Chaney et al., 2011; Lang et 
al., 2006) and other issues from the external governance environment perspective. Their findings 
indicate that enterprises’ micro-level operating decisions are largely influenced by the external 
governance environment. 
In recent years, scholars have gradually carried out research works related to corporate investment 
behavior from the external governance environment perspective. Levine and Zervos (1998) finds that 
the level of financial development has a significant impact on corporate investment behavior, while 
Simon et al. (2002)
 finds that the level of property rights protection and the willingness to invest are 
directly related. In addition, Bai et al. (2006) points out that there will be inefficient over-investment 
in state-owned listed companies in order to provide more jobs, and pay more taxes. Other scholars 
study the corporate over-investment using China’s special external governance environment. For 
instance, Yang and Hu (2007) studies the relationship between institutional environment and over-
investment of the free cash flows from the aspects of government intervention and financial 
development, respectively. The study finds that local government control and government 
intervention will increase over-investment of free cash flow, while financial development will reduce K. Chen et al. / Management Science Letters 4 (2014) 
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the over-investment of free cash flow. Industry regulations originate from market failures. Though we 
recognize that market failure is a necessary but not sufficient condition for implementing government 
regulations, but government control is still the dominant choice to govern market failures. Industry 
regulations are part and parcel of the development process from a planned economy to a market 
economy in China. On the one hand, since regulated industries have the characteristics of economies 
of scale, industry regulations can effectively prevent efficiency losses caused by excessive 
competition. On the other hand, since regulated industries have relatively large sunk costs, industry 
regulation can effectively prevent productivity decline caused by excessive competition. China’s 
regulated industries are related to peoples’ livelihood with a strong administrative features. Strong 
barriers to entry, low transaction costs and price monopoly are the advantages that make it easy for 
regulated industries to obtain excess economic profit. However, from efficiency point of view, 
regulated industries are less efficient compared to non-regulated industries. 
After reviewing the literature above, to our knowledge, we can find several shortcomings in the 
existing literature, namely: First, the existing literature is limited to some of the external governance 
environment factors, thus not fully reflecting the influence of the external governance environmental 
factors on corporate over-investment behavior. Second, existing studies have not revealed the 
mechanism of action of industrial regulations over the relationship between external governance 
environment and over-investment. And, third, though a number of scholars have conducted detailed 
studies on enterprise over-investment problem, none of them studies regional distribution 
characteristics of over-investment of Chinese listed companies. This paper intends: to apply the law 
and finance theory to analyze the influencing mechanism of external governance environment on 
corporate over-investment; to employ regulatory capture theory to explore the role of industry 
regulation in the impact of external governance environment on corporate over-investment; and, to 
reveal industry regulation’s mechanism of action towards the relationship between the external 
governance environment and over-investment. We hope to uncover the investment black-box of 
regulated industries. 
2.2 research hypothesis 
This paper combines data availability and scientific rationality of proxy variable selection, and 
considers external governance environment to be mainly composed by government intervention, the 
level of rule of law and the level of financial development. Considering that the aspects of the three 
main external governance environment factors are more fundamental and exogenous as compared to 
ownership system, system of board of directors, information disclosure system, independent auditing 
system, etc., thus, these factors will affect contracts signing, the cost of completed transactions as 
well as the efficiency of corporate governance. Figure 1 shows the transmission mechanism of the 
influence of external governance environment on corporate over-investment behavior. As a response 
to the external governance environment, the internal mechanism of corporate governance originated 
within the factors of external corporate governance environment and plays an important regulatory 
role in making corporate management decisions. In short, external governance environment 
significantly impacts internal mechanism of corporate governance, thereby affecting investment, 
financing, and other business decisions, which ultimately affects enterprise’s over-investment 
behavior. 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Transmission Mechanism of the influence of External Governance Environment on 
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The role played by the government in a market economy has a crucial impact on the country's 
economic development. Shleifer and Vishny (2002) indicates that, in the economy the government 
plays three roles, namely, “watchman”, “helping hand”, and, “grabbing hand”. In the economic 
transition period, the government of China has an important influence on resources allocation, thus 
impacting investment behaviors of listed companies through policies, administrative directives, etc. 
On the one hand, regulated industries are related to lifelines of the national economy. Regulated 
industries and the government are closely associated politically, and there is tacit alliance between the 
two. In order to maintain price control, administrative license, excess profits, and other special 
interests, regulated industries must help in the promotion of government officials, and in achieving 
social goals
  (Shleifer & Vishny, 1994), namely, boosting local GDP growth and promoting 
employment through increased investment hence inducing irrational excessive investment. According 
to the regulatory capture theory, over-investment behavior is an effective “rent-seeking investment”, 
and regulators would normally be "captured". On the other hand, due to the heterogeneity of the 
industry, regulated industries are more likely to be national policy beneficiaries. The 4 (four) trillion 
RMB investment plan implemented in 2008 largely benefits oil, coal, steel, transportation and other 
regulated industries, and such massive capital inflows encourage regulated industries to invest more. 
As there is a huge availability of funds, companies can still obtain state subsidies even when 
investment projects fail. Thus, this makes the regulated industries prone to over-investment behavior 
when subjected to government intervention. Non-regulated industries can generally be considered as 
fully competitive industries. Since the main objective of investment decisions is profit maximization, 
then investment policies of non-regulated industries are less affected by government intervention 
(Roques & Savva, 2009), as over-investment decisions that are damaging to profit maximization 
would not be an option even with government intervention. Based on the analysis above, we propose 
the following hypotheses:  
H1a: In regulated industries, government intervention and over-investment in listed companies are 
positively correlated.  
H1b: In non-regulated industries, government intervention and over-investment in listed companies 
are negatively correlated. 
Law and Finance is an extension of Law and Economics that sprung up in the 1970s. The law and 
finance theory pioneered by La Porta et al. (1998) analyzes the relationship between law and financial 
development at the national level. The results show that legal protection for investors can promote 
development of financial markets and intermediaries, thereby promoting business investment and 
economic growth. A study by Cambini and Rondi (2010) on the European energy industry shows that 
legal system has an important impact on investment decisions of regulated industries. Enterprise 
managers are inclined to have "managerial imperialism" to pursue large investment, and they may 
pursue self-interests due to the availability of resources at their disposal. According to the regulatory 
capture theory, the regional control rights spillover phenomenon is more extensive in regions with 
relatively low levels of the rule of law, thus, regulators and business managers can easily conspire to 
sign implicit contracts for personal gain. Due to the protection of implicit contracts, managers in 
regulated industries barely pay the corresponding price for their actions even when the investment 
decisions lead to failures. Consequently, the tendency of "empire building" by managers in regulated 
industries is more rampant. Therefore, in regions with relatively low levels of the rule of law, the 
over-investment behavior is more likely to be seen in regulated industries. Simon et al. (2002) further 
their research on the subject by investigating enterprise data of five countries from East Europe and 
the former Soviet Union (Russia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine). They examined the 
relationship between property right and entrepreneur investment. The results show that property 
rights protection and the corporate’s willingness to invest are positively correlated. Since these 
countries have imperfect legal systems and less efficient law enforcement, property rights of non-
regulated industries are often threatened and destroyed by underworlds or other underground 
organizations without the government as a "protective umbrella". In order to obtain effective property K. Chen et al. / Management Science Letters 4 (2014) 
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rights protection, companies must incur additional costs. Therefore, in regions with relatively low 
level of the rule of law, enterprises in non-regulated industries are rarely willing to increase 
investment, hence less to no chance of the existence of over-investment. Based on the above analysis, 
we propose the following hypotheses: 
H2a: In regulated industries; level of the rule of law and over-investment in listed companies are 
negatively correlated. 
H2b: In non-regulated industries; level of the rule of law and over-investment in listed companies are 
positively correlated. 
A country’s financial development has a significant impact on the investment decisions of 
enterprises. A study García-Herrero et al. (2006) argues that progress in the financial sector can 
promote market reforms in state-owned banks, thus making them more for economic purposes rather 
than political when allocating loans (especially, long-term loans) to regulated industries. This will 
restrict sources of investment funds in regulated industries, consequently constraining over-
investment. In addition to above, Fang (2006)
 finds that the more developed financial markets are, the 
higher capital allocation efficiency is, and, the more developed financial markets are, the higher 
independence of banks is. Under the circumstances, bank's credit decisions are more based on 
economic principles rather than government interventions. This gives non-regulated industries an 
opportunity to obtain funds necessary for investment, thus making it easy to formulate extensive 
investment patterns with high investment and low efficiency. Based on the above analysis, we 
propose the following hypotheses: 
H3a: In regulated industries; level of financial development and over-investment in listed companies 
are negatively correlated. 
H3b: In non-regulated industries; level of financial development and over-investment in listed 
companies are positively correlated. 
3. Research design 
3.1 Sample selection and Data sources  
We select data from the annual report of A-share listed companies from 2001 to 2010 as the sample 
data and use the following three ways to remove noise: (1) excluding listed companies under special 
treatment (ST) or particular transfer (PT) during 2001-2010; (2) excluding listed financial companies; 
And, (3) excluding listed companies with incomplete data. After the exclusion, we obtain a total of 
8016 observations. Financial data of the listed companies are all from RESSET financial research 
databases and CCER China's economic and financial databases. External governance environment 
data are from “NERI INDEX of Marketization of China’s Provinces - 2009 Report" (Hereinafter 
referred to as the "REPORT") compiled by Fan et al. (2010). The REPORT is a relatively 
authoritative report on the external governance environment in China as it evaluates the process of 
marketization of various regions in the country from five aspects, namely: “the relationship between 
government and market”, “the development of a non-state-owned economy”, “the development of 
goods market”, “the development of factor market”, and, “the development of market intermediary 
organizations and the legal environment”. 
3.2 Model and Variables 
This paper mainly studies over-investment of listed companies, which is specifically defined here as 
investments that allocate enterprise’s resources in projects with negative NPV (Jensen, 1986). At 
present, main models that measure over-investment include; investment-cash flow sensitivity model 
of FHP
  (Fazzari et al., 1988), the Vogt’s (1994) cash flow/investment opportunities cross-term 
discriminant model, and
 the residual measurement model proposed by Richardson (2006). Based on   2334
the free cash flow theory, Richardson
  constructs a model to reasonably estimate the enterprise’s 
normal level of investment. He
  divides enterprises’ new investment into expected investment 
spending and unexpected investment spending determined by factors such as; growth, capital 
structure, cash flow, profitability, size, etc. Through this model, a modest investment level can be 
reasonably calculated. When the level of real investment is greater than the value predicted by the 
model, then there exists over-investment, and the difference between the two values is the degree of 
over-investment. The Richardson’s model is favored by many scholars (Biddle et al., 2009; D’Mello 
& Miranda, 2010; Ahmed & Duellman, 2011) for its rational design and easy execution. This study 
builds its model (1) for measuring over-investment based on Richardson’s model. The model is as 
follows below: 
01 12 13 14 15 16 17 1   t t t tt ttt i j INV Gro Lev Cfo Roa Siz INV Age Industry Year                      (1)  
where: 0  is a constant;  17 ~   are coefficients of each variable;  i  is the regression coefficient of the 
industry dummy variables, i = 8,9,10 ... 18;  j  is the coefficient of the year dummies, j = 19,20,21 ... 
23;  t is the year of the sample, t =2001, 2002, 2003 ... 2010;   is the residual term -- when  is 
greater than 0, it is the degree of over-investment, while it is the degree of under-investment when it 
is less than 0. Variables in the model (1) are defined in Table 1 below: 
Table 1  
Variables setting and calculation in the Model (1)  
 Variable  Variable Name  Variable  Variable Calculation 
Dependent 
variable 
new capital investment  INVt  (an increase in fixed assets, construction in progress, and long-term 
investments in the yeart/ total assets at the beginning of yeart ) 
Explanatory 
variables 
enterprise growth ability  Grot-1  revenue growth rate of yeart-1 
asset-liability ratio  Levt-1  (total liabilities / total assets), at the end of yeart-1 
cash flow from operations   Cfot-1  (net operating cash flow/ total assets), at the end of yeart-1 
profitability  Roat-1  the ROA of yeart-1 
enterprise scale  Sizt-1  natural logarithm of total assets at the end of yeart-1 
additional capital investment to prior 
investment 
INVt-1  (an increase in fixed assets, construction in progress and long-term 
investments in the yeart-1/ total assets at the beginning of yeart-1) 
listed age  Age t-1  the number of years a company has been listed. 
Control 
variables 
industry dummy variable  Industry  11 industry dummies are set to control the influence of industry difference 
year dummy variable  Year  5 year dummies are set to control the effect of macro-economy in the year. 
 
After measuring model (1), we can get the degree of enterprise’s over-investment. To reveal the 
influence of industry regulations on the relationship between the external governance environment 
and corporate investment, the paper builds model (2). Considering the principle factors affecting 
over-investment are agency costs and cash flow from financing, we refer studies Ahmed and 
Duellman (2011)
 and Singh and Davidson III(2003) and control major shareholders fund occupancy, 
agency costs, and cash flow from financing activities, and other factors which affect over-investment. 
To control the influence of macroeconomic situation in different years on enterprise investment 
decisions, we add the year dummy variable. In summary, model (2) is built as follows: 
01 2 3 4 5 6 _ tt t t t t t j Over INV Gov Law Fin Orecta Agency Issue Year                (2)  
where:  0   is a constant;  16 ~    are coefficients of each variable;  j   is the annual regression 
coefficient of year dummies; j = 7, 8, 9 ... 11; t is the year of the sample, t =2001, 2002, 2003 ... 
2010; and,  is the residual term. 
Variables in the model (2) are defined in Table 2 below: 
 K. Chen et al. / Management Science Letters 4 (2014) 
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Table 2  
Variables setting and calculation in Model (2)  
Variable type  Variable name  Variable 
bl
Variable calculation 
Dependent 
variable 
Over-investment  Over_INVt  the degree of over-investment of yeart, i.e., the positive residual value in 
regression of the Richardson’s model
[44] 
Explanatory 
variables 
Government intervention 
index 
Govt  “reducing government intervention to enterprises” index of yeart (from the 
REPORT). 
The rule of law index  Lawt  financial Industry Marketization index of yeart (from the REPORT). 
Financial development   
index 
Fint  “reducing government intervention to enterprises” index of yeart (from the 
REPORT). 
Control variables 
Major shareholders fund 
occupancy 
Orectat  (other receivables/ total assets), at the end of yeart 
Agency cost  Agencyt  (administration expenses/ total assets), at the end of yeart 
Cash flow from financing  Issuet  (cash flow from financing/ total assets), at the end of yeart 
Year dummies  Year  5 year dummies are set to control the effect of macro-economy in the year. 
 
On the choice of regulated industries, there are three main criteria as follows: First, according to the 
principles of the strategic adjustment of state-owned economy, regulated industries are divided into; 
mining, petroleum, chemical, plastic, metal, non-metal, electricity, gas and water production and 
supply industries, as well as, transportation, warehousing, IT, etc., industries. Second, according to 
the need for government approval on investment projects, regulated industries are defined as; 
electricity, water, gas, coal, petroleum, iron and steel, nonferrous metals, aerospace, salt mining, 
tobacco, railways, telecommunications, postal services, finance and other industries. And, third, 
according to industry barriers to entry level, regulated industries are defined as construction and 
engineering, energy equipment and services, metals, non-metallic, mining, automotive, financial 
services, electricity, gas, and water utilities complexes, road and rail transport, media, maritime, 
aviation and aviation logistics and freight forwarding, diversified telecommunications services, and 
other industries. After the comparative analysis, we find that the above-mentioned three methods 
differ primarily in the financial sector. Financial sector invests primarily in stocks, bonds, foreign 
exchange and other forms of monetary value of financial assets which is different from physical 
investments by normal enterprises. As the financial value of the investment is very unstable and 
difficult to reasonably evaluate its level of investment and efficiency, thus this article does not take it 
into account. Meanwhile, because China is in economic transition, the strategic adjustment of state-
owned economy has played a huge ideological guiding role, therefore using the method proposed by 
Xia and Fang (2005) to define regulated industries has certain rationality. 
4.   Empirical results and analysis 
4.1   Descriptive Statistics 
4.1.1 Descriptive statistics of variables 
After running regression on the sample of 8016 data based on model (1), we found that 3309 show 
excessive investment behavior, which makes up a 41.28 percent of total sample, leaving 4707, a 
59.72% of total sample which shows under-investment behavior. Table 3 shows characteristics of the 
variables’ descriptive statistics for the model (2), in which: from the government intervention index, 
the rule of law index, and financial development index; it can be seen that there exists a huge 
difference in external governance environment among various areas in China, e.g., government 
intervention index, whereby, the highest is 12.670 while the lowest is only -2.170. This is mainly 
because China is a large country with diversified economic geography and culture, which includes, 
differences in the path of regional economic development, the impact of unbalanced regional 
development strategies led by the central government, as well as the distortions caused by the 
government’s actions at all levels under the current decentralized system. These, together, have 
largely contributed to the regional imbalances of external governance environment in the country.   2336
Table 3  
Descriptive Statistics of Variables in Model (2) 
Variable Size  Mean  Median  Min Maximum  Standard  deviation 
Over_INV  3309  0.130  0.082  0.000  1.110  0.164 
Gov  3309  7.084 7.050 -2.170  12.670  3.490 
Law  3309  5.696  5.640  -0.400  10.900  2.748 
Fin  3309  8.351 8.490 0.840 12.01 2.115 
Orecta  3309  0.028  0.014  0.001  0.547  0.041 
Agency  3309  0.042 0.035 -0.006  0.273 0.030 
Issue  3309  0.042  0.027  -0.581  0.617  0.104 
Note: The minimum value of overinvestment is 0.00007. 
4.1.2 Regional Distribution of Over-investment in Chinese listed companies 
To intuitively report the regional distribution of over-investment in listed companies in China, this 
paper divides the ten years’ average over-investment level of listed companies from the country’s 31 
provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities (excluding; Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao 
S.A.R.) into three groups from low to high, where, 10 provinces with the lowest over-investment 
level are in group 1, 10 provinces with the highest over-investment level are in group 3, and, the 
remaining 11 provinces are in group 2. Table 4 displays the regional distribution of over-investment 
under both groups, regulated and non-regulated industries. On the one hand, the top half shows the 
regional distribution of over-investment under regulated industries. From the perspective of economic 
geography, the distribution of over-investing companies under regulated industry show significant 
local spatial clusters. Specifically, the lowest level of over-investing enterprises group is mainly 
found in the eastern region of the country, while the highest degree of over-investing enterprise group 
is in the western region, with the remaining extent of over-investing enterprises group centered in the 
central region. On the other hand, the bottom half shows the regional distribution of over-investment 
under non-regulated industries, and overall its extent is significantly smaller than regulated industry. 
The lowest level of over-investment enterprise group is mainly found in the central and western 
regions, while distribution of the remaining two groups follow no specific pattern. 
Because of the differences in economic geography and culture among various regions in China, as 
well as the path of economic development and non-balanced regional development strategies led by 
the central government, the external governance environment of various regions also show a clear 
imbalance. Eastern region’s external governance environment in the eastern region tops other 
regions’ followed by the central region, and the western region has the worst external governance 
environment. Combining the features of regional distribution of over-investment in the country, we 
find an interesting phenomenon: under the regulated industries, the external governance environment 
of the regions with lower degree of over-investment is relatively good, while the external governance 
environment of the region with higher degree of over-investment is relatively poor. On the other 
hand, under non-regulated industry, the external governance environment of the regions with lower 
degree of over-investment is relatively poor. So, is this phenomenon typical? This will be verified 
through regression analysis in the empirical analysis section.   
It is worth noting that, the investment behavior of a listed company is strongly associated with the 
external governance environment of the region the investment takes place. But, in this paper, the 
regional distribution of over-investment is based on where the listed company is registered rather than 
where the investment takes place. We feel is imperative to mention that, as: on one hand, it is difficult 
to obtain investment information from the regions of investment since financial data of the listed 
companies do not disclose specific details of investment projects, hence it is difficult to study the 
impact of external governance environment on over-investment in these investment regions. On the 
other hand, China’s company law and company registration regulations require companies to engage 
in business at their registered residential address. According to the principles of territorial 
management, investment, financing and other business activities will be directly subjected to 
supervision by the local industry and commerce departments, as well as taxation, auditing and other K. Chen et al. / Management Science Letters 4 (2014) 
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departments at the area of registration. This also shows that local area’s external governance 
environment can influence enterprise’s over-investment behavior. Thus, from this, the study’s choice 
of area of registration in place of investment location may as well be advantageous. 
Table 4  
Regional distribution of over-investment under regulated and non-regulated industries 
  Group 1  Group 2  Group 3 
Regulated Industry  Beijing, Tianjin, Shandong, Jiangsu, 
Shanghai, Zhejiang, Hunan, Yunnan, 
Guangxi, Guangdong 
Heilongjiang, Inner Mongolian, 
Liaoning, Shanxi, Hebei, Henan, Anwei, 
Hubei, Chongqing, Jiangxi, Hainan 
Jilin, Xinjiang, Gansu, Ningxia, 
Shaanxi, Fujian, Guizhou, Sichuan, 
Qinghai, Tibet 
Non-regulated Industry  Heilongjiang, Jilin, Inner Mongolian, 
Gansu, Qinghai, Shanxi, Shandong, 
Sichuan, Hunan, Jiangxi 
Liaoning, Hebei, Henan, Shaanxi, 
Chongqing, Fujian, Guangxi, 
Guangdong, Yunnan, Xinjiang, Hainan 
Beijing, Tianjin, Jiangsu, 
Shanghai, Zhejiang, Anhui, Hubei, 
Guizhou, Tibet, Ningxia 
 
4.2 Comparative Analysis between the Groups 
To analyze over-investment differences between regulated and non-regulated industries, we use the 
Independent samples t-Test. Table 5 shows comparative analysis results between the regulated and 
non-regulated industries. From Table 5, we can see that the degree of over-investment in the 
regulated industries group is significantly higher than in the non-regulated industries group. 
Specifically, the average of over-investment in the regulated industries group is 0.150, while in the 
non-regulated industries group is 0.114, and the mean difference between the two groups is 
significant at 0.01 level. This conclusion also confirms that the A-J Effect, proposed by Averch et al. 
and Takayama et al. is an objective reality in China’s capital market, that is, regulated industries are 
more driven to over-investment than non-regulated industries.  
Table 5  
Independent Samples Test 
      Regulated industry  Non-regulated industry  Comparison  
Average Average  F-value  P-value   
Degree of Over-investment  0.150  0.114  42.794 0.000*** 
Sample size  1455  1854 
Note: ① ***, **, * denote significance at; 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 level, respectively, two-tailed test. 
4.3 Correlation analysis 
We perform the correlation test on the variables in the model (2), and Table 6 shows the results. 
Among the main concerns, is the possibility that there may exist multicollinearity problem among, 
“Gov”, “Law”, and “Fin” as the correlation coefficients between the variables are greater than 0.5. 
Thus, to avoid this, during regression process, we must separately insert government intervention 
index, the rule of law index, and financial development index into the model in order to reduce the 
noise in the findings due to the possible multicollinearity problem. To ensure robustness of the study, 
we record the variance inflation factor during the regression of model (2). This is detailed below:     
Table 6  
Correlation Values of Main Variables 
Variable Over_INV  Gov  Law  Fin  Orecta  Agency  Issue 
Over_INV  1.000  0.025  0.047***  0.027  -0.091***  -0.130***  0.185*** 
Gov    0.038**  1.000  0.681*** 0.818*** -0.048***  0.004 -0.125*** 
Law   0.056***  0.713***  1.000  0.744***  -0.047***  0.066***  -0.154*** 
Fin  0.041**  0.826*** 0.762*** 1.000  -0.061***  0.064***  -0.131*** 
Orecta  -0.160***  -0.075***  -0.073***  -0.062***  1.000  0.089***  -0.079*** 
Agency  -0.185***  -0.012  0.063*** 0.050*** 0.220*** 1.000 -0.227*** 
Issue  0.227***  -0.135***  -0.153***  -0.140***  -0.072***  -0.246***  1.000 
Note: Above the diagonal are the Pearson correlation coefficients, while below are the Spearman correlation coefficients.   2338
4.4 Regression analysis 
Table 7 shows results of the regression analysis of model (2). To avoid the multicollinearity problem 
among the three external governance environment variables, we separately insert one variable at a 
time into model (2) to run tests. From the impact of government intervention index on corporate over-
investment, the degree of over-investment in regulated industries and government intervention index 
are negatively correlated at 0.10 significance level (t= -1.724), while the degree of over-investment in 
non-regulated industries and government intervention index are positively correlated at 0.10 
significance level (t=1.647), which supports hypotheses H1a and H1b. This conclusion confirms that 
government intervention in business may have positive as well as negative externalities. Different 
investment behaviors of enterprises are not only the result of government intervention, but also the 
enterprises’ sub-optimal choices to adapt to the existing external governance environment, the 
choices which may deviate from the goal of maximizing corporate value. From the effect of the rule 
of law index on corporate over-investment, the rule of law index is negatively correlated to the degree 
of over-investment in regulated industries at a 0.05 significance level (t=-1.980), while the degree of 
over-investment in non-regulated industries and the rule of law index are positively correlated at a 
0.100 significance level (t=3.532). This also verifies hypotheses H2a and H2b. From the influence of 
financial development index on corporate over-investment, financial development index is negatively 
correlated to the degree of over-investment in regulated industries at 0.10 significance level (t=-
1.681), while the degree of over-investment in non-regulated industries and financial development 
index are positively correlated at a 0.100 significance level (t=3.057), which also proves hypotheses 
H3a and H3b. 
Table 7  
Regression Results 
Variables  Regulated industry  Non-regulated industry 
Gov Law  Fin  Gov Law Fin 
Intercept  0.155***  0.129***  0.138***  0.111***  0.094***  0.098*** 
  (12.576)  (7.510)  (8.540)  (8.793)  (7.459)  (7.590) 
Gov    -0.046*    0.041*    
  (-1.724)    (1.647)    
Law     -0.057**      0.091***   
    (-1.980)      (3.532)   
Fin     -0.045*      0.075*** 
     (-1.681)      (3.057) 
Orecta  -0.043*  -0.044*  -0.042  -0.060**  -0.060**  -0.058** 
  (-1.646)  (-1.648)  (-1.586)  (-2.587)  (-2.567)  (-2.505) 
Agency  -0.109*** -0.115*** -0.112***  -0.029  -0.029  -0.029 
  (-4.194) (-4.396) (-4.292) (-1.231) (-1.256) (-1.243) 
Issue  0.186***  0.191***  0.188***  0.133***  0.139***  0.136*** 
  (7.175)  (7.313)  (7.229)  (5.592)  (5.840)  (5.747) 
Year  control control control control control control 
F-Value  11.509***  11.612***  11.452***  7.901***  8.695***  8.442*** 
Adjusted R
2  0.307 0.308 0.306 0.230 0.241 0.237 
Sample size  1455  1455  1455  1854  1854  1854 
Note: The numbers in parentheses are the T value (two-tailed); the variance inflation factor (VIF) of each variable in the regression is much lower than 10, which further 
indicates that there is no serious multicollinearity in regression equation. Due to limited space, the values are not repeated in the table. 
After the comparison, we can see that external governance environment has an inverse effect on over-
investment in both regulated and non-regulated industries. Due to the difference in the industry 
nature, the effect of external governance environment on corporate over-investment got reversed. 
Therefore, the basic assumptions of this study are verified. Through comparison we can also see that 
the rule of law index affects corporate over-investment the most compared to the other two external 
governance environment variables effect coefficients. For instance, in non-regulated industry, the 
effect coefficient of the rule of law index is 0.091 which is greater than the effect coefficients of 
government intervention index and financial development index, which are, 0.041 and 0.075, 
respectively. This is also true in regulated industries samples. We can conclude that, of the three K. Chen et al. / Management Science Letters 4 (2014) 
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external governance environment factors, the rule of law index influences corporate over-investment 
behavior the most. In a market economy, as an important external governance mechanisms, the legal 
system plays a crucial role and high level of law enforcement can reduce transaction costs in 
economic activities. The fifth National Congress of the Communist Party of China made the 
“governing the country according to law and building a socialist country ruled by law” as a major 
strategic task to be achieved, and China's legal system continues to enhance legal awareness to 
popular support, as well as improving the rule of law in the country. This change in external 
governance environment factors has had a major impact on the corporate investment behavior, thus 
greatly constraining over-investment behavior.     
4.5 Robust Analysis 
4.5.1 Definition of Over-investment 
Considering Richardson model, there may exist systematic bias as a result of the effect of 
macroeconomic policies, market conditions, etc., which can cause systematic over-investment 
problem in listed companies. We divide the residuals of the model (1) regression into three groups 
sorted according to size, in which the group with the largest residuals is the over-investment sample 
group. 
4.5.2 Sample Clusters 
While analyzing regional characteristics of over-investment in China, we discovered one problem: 
there is a large correlation between sample distribution and external governance environment, and, 
regions with good external governance environment have a relatively large number of listed 
companies while a number of listed companies in the regions with poor external governance 
environment is relatively small, and also, there exist some clusters in the sample distribution. The 
sample size of over-investing enterprises in Shanghai, Guangdong, and Jiangsu is; 514, 339 and 236, 
respectively, bringing to a total of 1089, accounting for 32.91% of the sample, while it is 1, 9, and 12 
in Ningxia, Qinghai, and Tibet, respectively, for a total of just 22, accounting for only 0.66% of the 
total sample. To further investigate whether the sample distribution is related to over-investment, this 
paper introduces instrumental variables to conduct tests. Main steps are as follows below: 
First step, building regression models by setting different governance factors as explanatory variables 
and then respectively regressing them with each region’s sample size N. The specific model is as 
shown below: 
01                                          nt nt Institution N     (3)  
where: from the model (3) above, Institution refers to the government intervention index, the rule of 
law index, and financial development index;  0  is constant,  1  is a variable coefficient; n stands for 
regions (n=1, 2, 3…, 31); t is the year of the sample (t=2001, 2002 … 2010);  is the residual. 
Second step, seeking instrumental factors by sequentially setting government intervention index, the 
rule of law index, and the financial development index as the explained variables in model (3) and 
regress, and extracting regression residuals three times, which are the instrumental variables, namely 
IVGov, IVLaw, and IVFin. And, the third step, re-testing: this is done by inserting the obtained three 
instrumental variables in the model (2) as explanatory variables and conduct regression analysis. 
After examination and analysis, we find that the empirical results don’t have substantial changes. 
4.5.3 The external governance environmental data selection  
Since the REPORT for 2010 provides data only for 2003-2007 period, instead of using external 
governance environment data for 2008-2010, we use the data for 2007, which may impact the   2340
findings. To eliminate this effect, the article adopts the following four methods to conduct tests: (1) 
Predicting data of 2008-2010 using the average growth rate of external governance environmental 
data for 2003-2007; (2) Using linear regression on the external governance environment data of 2003-
2007 to predict the data for 2008-2010 period; (3) Directly using the average of external governance 
environment data of 2003-2007; and, (4) Only choosing the sample data in 2003-2007. After 
inspection, we found that the regression results of the four methods are consistent with the previous 
results above, which further illustrates the robustness of the results of this study. 
5. Conclusion 
We take non-financial corporations listed at Shanghai and Shenzhen in China as our sample, and 
empirically test the relationship between external governance environment and corporate over-
investment based on the differences between regulated and non-regulated industries. The results 
reveal that: first, from the perspective of economic geography; the distribution of over-investment in 
listed companies under the regulated industry shows local spatial clustering phenomenon, while on 
the other hand non-regulated industry conforms to no regularity. Second, in regulated industries, 
improvement in the external governance environment can inhibit over-investment behavior, that is, 
the degree of government intervention, the level of rule of law, and the level of financial development 
are negatively correlated to over-investment. And, third, further study found that among the factors in 
external governance environment, the level of rule of law affects over-investment the most.       
According to the research findings, we propose the following measures: to begin with, regulators 
must formulate policies which adapt to local conditions so as to restrict corporate over-investment 
behavior, and to avoid “one size fits all” regulatory policies, as well as strengthening regional 
supervision where the over-investment behavior is serious. Second, introduction of the western “cost-
benefit analysis” to improve economic efficiency of regulations governing government sectors so as 
to reduce hidden costs, as well as avoiding efficiency loss. Moreover, strengthening ideological and 
moral education and supervision of regulatory authorities to prevent the occurrence of “regulatory 
capture” phenomenon. Finally, promoting the construction of external governance environment, 
reducing unnecessary government interventions in the economy, increasing the level of financial 
development as well as the level of the rule of law, and, allowing external governance environment to 
fully play the positive role towards business decision making.  
Although a number of scholars have carried out empirical researches on how external governance 
environment impacts corporate over-investment using a single factor, but many are in-short of in-
depth analysis on how the entire external governance environment affect over-investment, and the 
literatures rarely take into account industry regulations which play a key role. Based on the law and 
finance theory, and the regulatory capture theory, we conduct a detailed analysis on how governance 
environment, industry regulation and over-investment relate to each other, and provide a novel 
perspective in understanding over-investment behavior in Chinese listed companies during China’s 
economic transition period. But, the article still has a few shortcomings as are listed below; First of 
all, this paper defines the scope of regulated industries based on the principles in the strategic 
adjustment of state-owned economy: with the continuous development of economic transition and the 
state of economic reforms in related areas, and with the constant change in the scope of industrial 
regulations, thus, how substantiated is the established conclusion is highly uncertain, therefore we 
will be conducting a follow-up study. Second, factors affecting investment behavior are complicated, 
but we only considered the impact of external governance environment and industry regulations while 
ignoring the effect of nature of property rights, manager’s reputation, just to mention a few, thus, we 
will be conducting an in-depth follow-up study. And, finally, as companies’ investment activities 
vary widely, a simple model cannot fully interpret the economic significance of the investment 
activities. In the future, we will put more efforts into the research on the measurement of the level of 
corporate investment and efficiency.        K. Chen et al. / Management Science Letters 4 (2014) 
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